In this paper, we describe a collaborative information retrieval method among personal repositorie and an implementation of the method on a personal agent framework. We propose a framework for personal agents that aims to enable the sharing and exchange of information resources that are distributed unevenly among individuals. The kernel of a personal agent framework is an RDF(resource description framework)-based information repository for storing, retrieving and manipulating privately collected information, such as documents the user read and/or wrote, email he/she exchanged, (...) web pages he/she browsed, etc. The repository also collects annotations to information resources that describe relationships among information resources and records of interaction between the user and information resources. Since the information resources in a personal repository and their structure are personalized, information retrieval from other users' is an important application of the personal agent. A vector space model with a personalized concept-base is employed as an information retrieval mechanism in a personal repository. Since a personalized concept-base is constructed from information resources in a personal repository, it reflects its user's knowledge and interests. On the other hand, it leads to another problem while querying other users' personal repositories; that is, simply transferring query requests does not provide desirable results. To solve this problem, we propose a query equalization scheme based on a relevance feedback method for collaborative information retrieval between personalized concept-bases. In this paper, we describe an implementation of the collaborative information retrieval method and its user interface on the personal agent framework. (shrink)

Mark Jago’s four arguments against Takashi Yagisawa’s extended modal realism are examined and shown to be ineffective. Yagisawa’s device of modal tense renders three of Jago’s arguments harmless, and the correct understanding of predications of modal properties of world stages blocks the fourth one.

Proof-theory has traditionally been developed based on linguistic (symbolic) representations of logical proofs. Recently, however, logical reasoning based on diagrammatic or graphical representations has been investigated by logicians. Euler diagrams were introduced in the eighteenth century. But it is quite recent (more precisely, in the 1990s) that logicians started to study them from a formal logical viewpoint. We propose a novel approach to the formalization of Euler diagrammatic reasoning, in which diagrams are defined not in terms of regions as in (...) the standard approach, but in terms of topological relations between diagrammatic objects. We formalize the unification rule, which plays a central role in Euler diagrammatic reasoning, in a style of natural deduction. We prove the soundness and completeness theorems with respect to a formal set-theoretical semantics. We also investigate structure of diagrammatic proofs and prove a normal form theorem. (shrink)

Modal realism -- Time, space, world -- Existence -- Actuality -- Modal realism and modal tense -- Transworld individuals and their identity -- Existensionalism -- Impossibility -- Proposition and relief -- Fictional worlds -- Epistemology.

Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, considers how one becomes virtuous. However, when asking the question of how, he does not refer to ‘by friend’ as an option; all he refers to are ‘by learning’, ‘by training’, ‘by habituation’, ‘by god’ and ‘by luck’. Why does he not do so? First, I point out the fact that both Aristotle and Plato do not refer to the option of ‘by friend’ when asking the question of how. Second, I argue that Aristotle does (...) not overlook the educational role of friendship. He understands that one needs friends. Third and finally, I consider the reason why Aristotle hesitates to emphasize the educational role of friendship and indicate that his theory of the mean causes it. This reveals the strained relationship between his theory of the mean and that of friendship in his ethical theory. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAnother individual’s gaze automatically shifts an observer’s attention to a location. This reflexive response occurs even when the gaze is presented subliminally over a short period. Another’s gaze also increases the preference level for items in the gaze direction; however, it was previously unclear if this effect occurs when the gaze is presented subliminally. This study showed that the preference levels for nonsense figures looked at by a subliminal gaze were significantly greater than those for items that were subliminally looked (...) away from. Targets that were looked at by a subliminal gaze were detected faster ; however, the participants were unable to detect the gaze direction. These results indicate that another individual’s gaze automatically increases the preference levels for items in the gaze direction without conscious awareness. (shrink)

This paper proves the strong normalization of classical natural deduction with disjunction and permutative conversions, by using CPS-translation and augmentations. Using them, this paper also proves the strong normalization of classical natural deduction with general elimination rules for implication and conjunction, and their permutative conversions. This paper also proves that natural deduction can be embedded into natural deduction with general elimination rules, strictly preserving proof normalization.

Deep theorizing about possibility requires theorizing about possible objects. One popular approach regards the notion of a possible object as intertwined with the notion of a possible world. There are two widely discussed types of theory concerning the nature of possible worlds: actualist representationism and possibilist realism. They support two opposing views about possible objects. Examination of the ways in which they do so reveals difficulties on both sides. There is another popular approach, which has been influenced by the philosophy (...) of Alexius Meinong. The Meinongian approach is relevant to theorizing about possible objects because it attempts to construct a general theory of objects other than ordinary concrete existing objects. Independently of the debate about the nature of possible worlds or about Meinongianism, it is not always as straightforward as it may at first appear to determine whether putative possible objects are indeed possible. Another category of object similar to that of a possible object is the category of a fictional object. Although initially attractive, the idea that fictional objects are possible objects should not be accepted blindly. An important instance of theoretical usefulness of possible objects is their central role in the validation of two controversial theorems of a simple quantified modal logic. (shrink)

Sherlock Holmes is a fictional individual. So is his favorite pipe. Our pre-theoretical intuition says that neither of them is real. It says that neither of them really, or actually, exists. It also says that there is a sense in which they do exist, namely, a sense in which they exist “in the world of” the Sherlock Holmes stories. Our pre-theoretical intuition says in general of any fictional individual that it does not actually exist but exists “in the world of” (...) the relevant fiction. I wish to defend this pretheoretical intuition. To do so, I need to defend two claims: that fictional individuals do not actually exist, and that they exist “in the world of” the relevant fiction. The aim of this paper is to defend the first claim. (shrink)

Feinberg and Mallatt, in their presentation of neurobiological naturalism, have suggested that visual consciousness was acquired by early vertebrates and inherited by a wide range of descendants, and that its neural basis has shifted to nonhomologous nervous structures during evolution. However, their evolutionary scenario of visual consciousness relies on the assumption that visual consciousness is closely linked with survival, which is not commonly accepted in current consciousness research. We suggest an alternative idea that visual consciousness is linked to a specific (...) class of agency, consequently justifying their phylogenetic claim. We also examine the implication of their phylogenetic claim: visual consciousness is homologous across vertebrates, but its neural basis is not. This apparent incongruence illustrates a general phenomenon of homology, and that the resulting hierarchical view of visual consciousness and its neural basis can be straightforwardly accommodated by neurobiological naturalism. Throughout these discussions, we aim to address the potential theoretical issues in neurobiological naturalism and refine the picture illustrated by Feinberg and Mallatt regarding phylogenetic distribution and trajectories of visual consciousness. (shrink)

林家は、朱子学者・林羅山を始祖とする江戸幕府に仕えた儒官の家柄である。大坂冬の陣の発端となった方広寺鐘銘事件から、史書『本朝通鑑』の編纂、湯島聖堂の創建、大学頭叙任、赤穂浪士討ち入り事件への対応、そし て新井白石との対立まで―。初代羅山・二代鵞峰・三代鳳岡は、歴代将軍の寵用と冷遇に翻弄されながらも、江戸期朱子学の確立に奔走した。その林家三代一五〇年の闘いと事績を描く。.